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# STUDY PROJECT

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## ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: CAN THE "SPECIAL" RELATIONSHIP SURVIVE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER?

BY

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

93 5 25 169

93-11759

## REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Unclassified

1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS

2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY

3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT

Approved for public release.  
Distribution is unlimited.

2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)

5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)

6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

U.S. Army War College

6b. OFFICE SYMBOL  
(if applicable)

7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION

6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)

Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)

8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING  
ORGANIZATION8b. OFFICE SYMBOL  
(if applicable)

9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)

10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS

PROGRAM  
ELEMENT NO.PROJECT  
NO.TASK  
NO.WORK UNIT  
ACCESSION NO.

11. TITLE (Include Security Classification)

Anglo-American Relations: Can the "Special" Relationship Survive in the New World Order?

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)

Colonel G. J. Barrett

13a. TYPE OF REPORT

Individual

13b. TIME COVERED

FROM \_\_\_\_\_ TO \_\_\_\_\_

14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)

15 April 1993

15. PAGE COUNT

44

16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

17. COSATI CODES

FIELD

GROUP

SUB-GROUP

18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Britain faced two principal rivals, Germany and the United States. With both, she became locked in industrial competition and a number of diplomatic disputes. Her response to the two powers was very different. With the United States, she started to cultivate what would later become to be known as the "special relationship," with the other, she drifted into deep antagonism that led to two world wars. This paper proposes that a 'special' relationship has always existed between Britain and America. The debate, and hence the substance of this paper, is about the realities of the relationship, its relevance and value in the future. It examines the development of the relationship from the inter-war years to the present day and draws lessons that may be relevant for the future. It describes the main factors that appear to be characteristic of the "New World Order" before testing these against the historical model and the main factors that form part of the formal relationships between states. The issues that fall from this analysis are discussed before concluding that the relationship is robust enough to be wheeled

20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT

☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☐ OTIC USERS

21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL

CLARENCE E. OLSCHNER, COL, USAF

22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)

(717) 245-3032

22c. OFFICE SYMBOL


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Block 19. ABSTRACT (Cont.)

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**USAWC CLASS OF 1993**

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**AUTHOR:** Colonel GJ Barrett

**TITLE:** Anglo-American Relations: Can the "Special" Relationship Survive In The New World Order?

**FORMAT:** An Individual Study Project.

**DATE:** 21 April 1993 **PAGES:** 44 **CLASSIFICATION:** Unclassified.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Britain faced two principal rivals, Germany and the United States. With both, she became locked in industrial competition and a number of diplomatic disputes. Her response to the two powers was very different. With the United States, she started to cultivate what would later become to be known as the "special relationship"; with the other, she drifted into deep antagonism that led to two world wars. This paper proposes that a 'special' relationship has always existed between Britain and America. The debate, and hence the substance of this paper, is about the realities of the relationship, its relevance and value in the future. It examines the development of the relationship from the inter-war years to the present day and draws lessons that may be relevant for the future. It describes the main factors that appear to be characteristic of the "New World Order" before testing these against the historical model and the main factors that form part of the formal relationships between states. The issues that fall from this analysis are discussed before concluding that the relationship is robust enough to be wheeled out for some time yet. The relationship will increasingly be set in the context of Britain in Europe where Britain could use her transatlantic connection to forge a new security regime. For the United States, seeking to maintain political and public support for a continuing engagement in a more European Europe will need the support of Britain without making it obvious it is doing so.

Accession For	
NTIS CRA&I	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

## INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Britain faced two principal rivals, Germany and the United States. With both, she became locked in industrial competition and diplomatic disputes. Her response to the two powers was very different. With the United States, she started to cultivate what would later become to be known as the 'special relationship', with the other, she drifted into deep antagonism that led to two world wars.<sup>1</sup>

By taking only a superficial look at the behaviour of the two countries over two centuries, it is perhaps easy to portray a persistent, even steady progress from mistrust to cordiality.<sup>2</sup> However, opinions vary widely not only on what may be at the heart of the relationship but also whether a special relationship has ever existed between the two countries. 'Special' suggests a relationship that is not only very close, but one that is identifiably different from other 'normal' relationships between nations. The challenge of deciding what is normality in the relationship between states, and therefore what can be regarded as special, has been grasped already by several historians and analysts. Attempts to romanticise the relationship have been dismissed as an agreeable 'myth', created to help cushion the shock of national decline<sup>3</sup>. It has been denounced as "a dangerous intellectual obstacle to acceptance of Britain's largely European role."<sup>4</sup> Sentimental attachments, cultural affinities, historical traditions, similarity in institutions and a common language have been rejected because the United States has such ties with other countries as well.<sup>5</sup> Even among supporters of a special relationship, it has been argued that the intimacy of the relationship formed during the Second World War was destroyed by the Suez *débâcle*, or the Cuban missile crisis, or the failure of Britain to give her support to the United States over Vietnam or by the decision by Britain to withdraw from East of Suez. Nonetheless, history shows that no two countries have ever been so completely "mixed up together .... for mutual and general advantage" to borrow the words of Sir Winston Churchill from 1940.<sup>6</sup>

This paper proposes that a special relationship has always existed between Britain and America but that one of the very attractions of the term 'special', first used by Sir Winston Churchill in 1946, is its vagueness. The debate, and therefore the substance of this paper, is about the realities of the relationship, its relevance and value in the future.

Defence is only one dimension of possible ties between states; nevertheless it has been one of the most intimate areas of co-operation between Britain and America and, as such, is seen by several observers as the core of the relationship. It is also, traditionally one of the most tangible and visible forms of a wider relationship between the two countries. The United States, it is argued, was only able to promulgate the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 and maintain its isolationist policies because of the domination of the British fleet and the protection that afforded to the United States.<sup>7</sup> This protection allowed the United States to expand westward across the continent unhindered by European powers. Britain benefited by precluding gains by her European rivals and by reducing the possibility that the United States would expand to the North into the less populated Canadian territories. It was this experience of mutual benefit that set the foundation of the special relationship of the twentieth century.

To attempt to look into the future, it is necessary to be aware of the past. The paper examines the development of the relationship from the inter-war years to the present day and draws lessons relevant for the future. It then describes themes that are characteristic of the 'New World Order' before testing them against historical models and the main factors that characterise relationships between states. Issues that fall from this analysis are discussed before more general conclusions are drawn on the future of the relationship.

## **A VITAL RELATIONSHIP**

### **BETWEEN THE WARS**

At the end of the First World War, the European Allies wanted vengeance and reparation, whilst America under President Woodrow Wilson wanted a world order in which imperialism, arms races and military alliances would be a thing of the past.<sup>8</sup> Although British liberalism had been beaten to its knees, British and American ideals were not as far apart as Wilson often implied. Despite the traces of imperialism that had coloured American foreign policy following the Spanish-American War of 1898, the compromises that Wilson made to win support in Europe for his ideal of the League of Nations was seen as betrayal by liberals at home and as a prop to British imperialism. The proposal to join the League was not ratified by Congress. Lloyd-George, the British prime minister, was heard remarking "America has been offered the leadership of the world, but the Senate has tossed the sceptre into the sea."<sup>9</sup>

Between the wars, whilst the New World prospered, the Old World destroyed itself. The Austro-Hungarian Empire disappeared and splintered into small, chaotic rival states. Germany, defeated, disarmed and embittered, was under a weak unpopular republican regime. Russia was torn by revolution, and France, though a victor, had lost one tenth of her male population.<sup>10</sup> Britain had come through better than most with her Empire increased. At the centre of British foreign policy was the hope that a close relationship with America would allow the Old World to manage discretely the New. However the 'Big Two' were to be as much rivals as collaborators. There were two great issues: finance and navies. Such were the financial pressures on Britain that, in 1933, she defaulted on her war debt. Without a common enemy, and in the throes of depression, rivalry became intense. In America, the idea grew that involvement in the Great War had been a huge mistake. In 1935, Congress passed the Neutrality Act aimed at preventing any future American emotional or financial involvement in Europe's wars. America was moving



towards superpower and isolationist status, while Britain was on the downward slope to decline and appeasement.

## THE SECOND WORLD WAR

In August 1939, Britain and France declared war on Germany. President Roosevelt, although at once siding with the Allies, still believed that it was the responsibility of the democracies of Western Europe to look to their own defence. The United States' policy remained neutral; nevertheless, the Neutrality Act was amended to allow trading, except in armaments, with belligerents. Sir Winston Churchill became Prime Minister in April 1940. Between 1940 and 1945, he sent Roosevelt a message, on average, every thirty-six hours.<sup>11</sup> "No lover," he said after the war, "ever studied the whims of his mistress as I did those of President Roosevelt."<sup>12</sup>

Despite opposition in the War Cabinet and uproar in the House of Commons, by September 1940, the Destroyers for Bases deal was signed. This traded 99 year leases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, Bahamas, St Lucia, Trinidad and British Guiana for a batch of over-age destroyers. Roosevelt justified this as enhancing the national security of the United States. As with most areas of co-operation, American interests were very much the determining factor.<sup>13</sup> Nonetheless, it was hardly a neutral act. Lend Lease was approved by Congress in March 1941. The uproar, this time, was in America. However, protests were to be overtaken by the bombing of Pearl Harbour. America entered the war in December.

Until that time, Anglo-American co-operation had grown up gradually by an unstructured 'mixing-up' process. Air crew training followed staff talks and scientific and intelligence information exchange increased. It was not one-sided. The Tizard scientific mission of August 1940 released to the United States critical details of the cavity magnetron for radar, jet engine details, and information on ship protection and anti-submarine devices.<sup>14</sup> It was clearly Winston Churchill's intention to make the United States as efficient as possible for the entry he

foresaw into the war. Intelligence collaboration established intelligence officers at missions in each country, but the details of how much real intelligence was exchanged, particularly on the existence of the ULTRA Japanese radio intercept before the Arcadia conference of December 1941, remains classified.

During 1942, the Churchill-Roosevelt relationship was at its closest. At all levels of government personal contact made co-operation easier. In World War I, America had refused to merge its war effort and jealously preserved its independence. At the Arcadia conference, General George C. Marshall pressed for the unprecedented step of joint command and the establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff followed.

The warmth of the relationship could not disguise differences of interest. These centred first on the Germany-first agreement. Many Americans in 1941 favoured an early victory in the Pacific. There were also disputes over how the Germany-first strategy should be achieved. Certainly North Africa played no part in the United States vision. Differences followed over the conduct of the Sicily and Italian campaigns, and over operations in the Balkans. United States suspicion of British colonial motivation led to a bitter row between Churchill and Roosevelt over India. In 1942 America was looking north from Burma towards China while Britain was looking south towards her interests in Malaya and Singapore. The Argonaut conference of January 1945, which discussed the 'broad' or 'narrow' front concept for the German advance, and the balance between occupation sectors, was described, by those who were there, as one of the most acrimonious disputes between the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the entire war. However, one can read the official record without suspecting that a single harsh word was spoken.<sup>15</sup> Although Germany-first carried the day, United States interests made Japan a more demanding priority and, even as early as 1943, more Americans were employed fighting Japanese than Germans. Despite differences and divergent secondary interests that should not be forgotten, nothing was ever allowed to prejudice the harmony of operational purpose and the achievement of the overriding common objective.<sup>16</sup> In terms of the range and depth of collaboration, the personal

intimacy, the deep mutual trust and the sharing of secrets, the relationship was remarkable, if not unique.<sup>17</sup>

## THE EARLY POST WAR YEARS

After the war, there was no guarantee that the intimate relationship would continue. Most lessons of the 1920s and 1930s were not encouraging. The wartime boom had laid the foundation for American prosperity for the next 25 years, while Britain was exhausted. The integrated war machine broke up swiftly although many defence links remained in place. Eight days after the end of the war, President Truman cancelled Lend-Lease. Rows over subsequent loan payments continued until 1946.

There were other signs of a change in the relationship. The McMahon Act cancelled the atomic partnership and, by 1947, Britain was forced for reasons of security and prestige to continue research alone. The governments were also at loggerheads over Palestine and Jewish immigration. More disturbing for the British, however, was the American attitude to the Soviet Union who had penetrated further into Europe than at any time since 1814. Despite Stalin's failure to honour the agreements from Yalta and Potsdam, Truman seemed to want no part of the British stand against Soviet expansionism. Opinions were slow to alter. Nonetheless, disagreements with the Soviet Union over reparations, the future of Germany, Poland and Eastern Europe, Stalin's failure to withdraw from Turkey and Iran led to the fusion of British and American zones in occupied Germany, the announcement of the Truman doctrine, and the dramatic acceptance by the United States of former British commitments in Greece. The Berlin blockade that followed in 1948 gave the final impetus to the formation of NATO, and the *de facto* stationing of atomic capable B-29 bombers in East Anglia without any formal basing agreement.

Atomic energy and the McMahon Act were the only real exceptions to the special relationship that was still developing. Britain had been a key player in all the main events, being

a co-ordinator for the Marshall Plan and architect of the Brussels Treaty and the Berlin airlift. Maintenance of the NATO commitment has been the cornerstone of British American policy ever since. However, Lewis Douglas, the US Ambassador, cabling Washington in August 1948 recorded that "Anglo-American unity is more firmly established than ever before in peacetime. Britain has never before been in a position where her national security and economic fate are so completely dependent, and at the mercy of another country's decisions. Almost every day brings new evidence of her weakness and dependence on the US. This is a bitter pill for a country accustomed to full control of her national destiny."<sup>18</sup>

## **KOREA AND SUEZ**

Nineteen fifty had heralded an era of greater co-operation that was to end in a further cyclical relapse over Suez in 1956. On 24 June 1950, North Korea invaded the South. Even if Britain's interests were not involved to the same extent as those of the United States, Prime Minister Atlee wished to be seen to be making a major effort in support of her closest ally. The contribution was to be significant in political rather than military terms. British concern was to prevent the United States from becoming embroiled in an Asian war that would divert American resources away from what she saw was its 'true' role - the defence of Europe. It was the beginning of a three year conflict that not only drew the United States into extensive commitments in Asia, but also brought Anglo-American relations, so recently restored by Marshall Aid and NATO, to a state of acrimony unmatched since the bitter row over the size of navies in the 1920s.<sup>19</sup> The major factor was China. Britain needed to cultivate the new Mao regime to safeguard her interests in Hong Kong whilst Truman replied decisively to Chinese involvement in Korea. The talk of atomic weapons caused Britain to scramble for safeguards and for the completion of a B-29 basing agreement. Other areas of disagreement emerged including: the wisdom of further American involvement in Asia, the significance of the peace treaty signed by Mao and Stalin, the necessary conditions for a Korean cease-fire, British colonialism, oil in Iran and the Baghdad Pact. However, by 1954, Britain could have felt that she had redressed some of the balance in the Anglo-American relationship by claiming credit for

major diplomatic agreements over Vietnam and Germany. In the first, she had restrained America and, in the second, had led Europe into a creative solution to the German re-armament dilemma.<sup>20</sup> Britain had reasserted her strategic importance by maintaining a permanent presence on the Continent and thus provided sufficient re-assurances to satisfy French concerns. Germany achieved full sovereignty, membership of NATO and re-armament. Britain had therefore started a process that allowed Germany to become the major European presence on the Central Front and, arguably, the United States' most important ally in Europe. Nonetheless, relations between British Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had approached breaking point more than once.

The Suez *débâcle* of 1956 provided a sharp reminder of the limits of both British and French power projection. It reflected British and American conflicting attitudes to communism and colonialism and the different stakes each had in the Middle East. It was also a tragedy of personalities involving Eden, with Churchill behind him, President Eisenhower and Dulles. Suez destroyed many cherished illusions about the special relationship, about communities of interest and about the ability of Britain to act on her own. Fortunately, of all the leaders of the Conservative party, Sir Harold MacMillan would prove best suited to satisfy the need felt on both sides of the Atlantic to heal the breach. He was half-American and had enjoyed a warm relationship with Eisenhower during the Second World War.

### ***RAPPROCHEMENT AND DETERRENCE***

Evidence of the new rapport became evident through the Bermuda Agreement of 1957; this laid the basis of the Anglo-American relationship that has endured to the present day. Some commentators report that Eisenhower thought that Britain had been treated unfairly and wanted her to share leadership, with the United States, of the nuclear deterrence strategy evolving within NATO.<sup>21</sup> Others suggest that the United States had found an urgent need to share the burden of that strategy. The launch of Sputnik that same year caused great American alarm. The

reaction was to strengthen the nuclear link with Britain since American ICBMs capable of reaching the Soviet Union had not yet entered service.

The effects of this *rapprochement* were several and various. The replacement of the McMahon Act with The Agreement for Co-operation on Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes, signed on 3 July 1958, provided the corner-stone and authority for current nuclear co-operation.<sup>22</sup> Although the Beanuda Thor basing agreement, with dual control, showed that the relationship was not a one-way street, the joint operation to send marines and airborne forces to Jordan to support King Hussein showed that Britain was clearly the poor relation. Nonetheless, Britain was to contribute independent nuclear research, aircraft basing agreements, facilities at Christmas Island for nuclear testing, steam catapults and the angled deck carrier to the relationship.

The latter part of the Eisenhower administration showed growing intimacy but also disparity. Britain had, in common with the United States, adopted nuclear deterrence as the main plank of its national defence strategy. Since it was likely that the British V-bomber force would be obsolete before it could be brought into service, Britain had started independent research into a missile system to be called Blue Streak. It was to be a fixed system and thus vulnerable like Thor. The United States offered to help by providing Skybolt, then in development, as an alternative system. It was also agreed that Polaris would be a possible fall-back option in exchange for American Polaris submarine basing facilities at Holy Loch in Scotland. During early 1962, ambiguous signals were received in London about the success of the Skybolt programme. These caused increasing concern.

Attention was to be diverted from Skybolt by the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. It has since been suggested that it would be as wrong to under-estimate Britain's role as it would be to exaggerate the degree to which MacMillan was able to influence President Kennedy's decisions.<sup>23</sup> Thus, in contrast to press comments in January 1993,<sup>24</sup> which typically seem to follow the release of Cabinet papers under the British 30 year rule, it can be argued that

the special relationship was not damaged by this crisis; it merely illustrated its survivability and vitality.

Cancellation of the Skybolt project led to a new row between London and Washington that was later described as one of the greatest confrontations in the history of Anglo-American relations.<sup>25</sup> MacMillan played his Polaris card. There was a strong lobby in America to remove Britain from the nuclear 'club' since the nuclear relationship was seen as an obstacle to better relations with De Gaulle's Europe. With relations again near breaking point, Secretary of State Acheson complained that Britain "had lost an empire and not yet found a role." MacMillan, who had developed a warm and friendly relationship with President Kennedy, squeezed the Polaris agreement from him, although reluctantly, in December 1962 at the Nassau Conference - but only by linking the deal to Holy Loch basing, and by recalling the spirit of his agreement with Eisenhower. This showed the same sentiment as the earlier destroyers-for-bases deal. It cemented a nuclear relationship that no other ally of the United States was to enjoy. "The British government" commented Anthony Howard in the *New Statesman*, "could hardly have its dependent status more brutally spelled out to them than it has this week."<sup>26</sup> Nevertheless, Britain had persuaded America to pay her nuclear club subscription for her, but the price was an undermining of Britain's bid to enter the EEC.

For the next decade, America became enmeshed in the most disastrous war of its history. Britain remained in suspense, contracting as a world power, but retaining her place at the top table, and yet excluded from the EEC. The allies were again to drift apart.

## **DIVERGENCE AND VIETNAM**

When Johnson became President following the assassination of Kennedy in 1963, Sir Harold Wilson replaced MacMillan. There was to be no personal rapport between the rough-spoken Texan and the wily Prime Minister. He was too 'ordinary'.<sup>27</sup> A socialist government in London was greeted with no great enthusiasm in Washington. There was talk of abandoning

control over Britain's nuclear weapons, surrendering all authority in world affairs and succumbing to the pressure to join the NATO multilateral force. In December 1964, Wilson remarked to Johnson that, "Some of those who talk about the special relationship are looking backwards and not looking forward. They talk about the nostalgia of our imperial age. We regard our relationship with you not as a special relationship, but as a close relationship governed by the only things that matter, unity of purpose and unity in our objectives."<sup>28</sup>

Despite the difficulties in London with nuclear matters and the multi-lateral force, it was the conflict in Vietnam that was to change Britain's perception of the United States. It showed the limit of American power and the bounds of the relationship with Britain at that time. Wilson, who viewed himself as a peacemaker, did not respond to repeated requests from Johnson even for a token force and earned his contempt for proffering advice from the sidelines. Wilson was particularly critical of the bombing of Hanoi. His concern was familiar. Protracted American involvement in Asia would divert resources from the defence of Europe. Wilson's repeated attempts to bring the belligerents to the negotiating table earned only Johnson's mistrust. "I won't tell you how to run Malaysia and you don't tell me how to run Vietnam" he protested in February 1965.<sup>29</sup> By 1968, the violence in Vietnam was spilling over in the streets. Under the merciless eye of television, Britain began to doubt whether America was indeed the bastion of liberty and pondered whether society was on the verge of collapse. The invasion of Czechoslovakia, however, provided a timely reminder that the other superpower did not even accept the principle of civil liberty.<sup>30</sup>

In Britain economic decline had continued, and she had been overtaken in world rankings by both Germany and France. By 1964, Germany had a larger Army. Two monetary crises led to the devaluation of Sterling in 1967. The cuts in public spending that followed included the announcement that Britain would withdraw from east of Suez, except Hong Kong, by 1971. Thundering telegrams of protest followed from Johnson who, with no spare troops to fill the vacuum in the Middle East, was forced to turn to Iran and Saudi Arabia to maintain the West's influence. In Britain this was seen as a shift in policy by Washington who had previously



consistently criticised Britain's imperialist role. By the time Nixon replaced Johnson as President, Britain, who had played no part in the SALT process, was no longer batting in the major league and was seeking a new relationship with the continent of Europe. There was clearly doubt in Washington about the value of such an ally.

## **THE EUROPEAN FACTOR OF THE SEVENTIES**

Until the late Sixties, America had been a strong supporter of a federal structure for Europe. By the early seventies, the cost of the Vietnam War was beginning to bite, world market shares were falling, competitiveness was declining, the dollar was over-valued, and the EEC, with its strict external tariff barriers, was becoming a serious economic rival. However, the United States was more preoccupied with ending the disastrous war in Vietnam, growing domestic problems and the emerging relationship between Russia and China than with developments in Europe. Sir Edward Heath, who had replaced Wilson as Prime Minister in 1970, saw no particular reason for elevating the relationship between Britain and America to any special level. His priority was entry into the EEC that he eventually achieved in 1973. Nixon, meanwhile, was seeking an even balance between the United States, Europe, the Soviet Union, Japan and China. Such a philosophy required a reassessment of America's security relationship with Europe. Within this balance, Europe would be expected to take a wider responsibility for her own defence. The 1972 proposal by National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to revise the Atlantic Charter was not well received. In previous misunderstandings Britain had often adopted the role of go-between, interpreting America to Europe and seeking to moderate the United States' policy in Europe. Heath, consumed with Europe, refused to enter private discussions with Washington and thought that the whole initiative was misguided. His reply to Washington suggested that all discussions must be conducted with the nine countries of the EEC as a whole. Further developments were killed by the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War. Heath intimated that the American use of British bases would be unwelcome, that the American motive was merely to increase legitimacy for its actions by identifying a partner, and that their own facilities were perfectly adequate.<sup>31</sup> British policy was to be 'even-handed' between the Arabs and Israel.

Heath also declined to use his influence with the rest of NATO and protested that Britain had been informed, and not consulted, over the affair. Washington, stirred up by Kissinger in particular, was furious.

There followed an associated weakening of the defence relationship that was reflected in such things as Britain's growing involvement in the Eurogroup, the creation of the IEPG and greater European defence collaboration. The United States showed an interest in dealing with western European states as a whole, especially over nuclear burden sharing and starting a 'two-way' street in defence procurement. By the mid-seventies, there was little left of the second world war partnership except in the nuclear, chemical, laser and intelligence fields. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was reported to have commented of Britain, "They're no longer a world power, all they've got are generals, admirals and bands."<sup>32</sup> Certainly Britain and the United States seemed further apart than at any time since the end of the second world war as both countries sought to rediscover their place in the world.

As Britain continued to decline as a world power, her relations with the United States became peripheral to vital issues in international affairs. Where Britain did matter was as a member of the EEC and NATO. However, Britain had not become wholly European, and the response to the European elections in 1979 was poor. There was little enthusiasm for a move towards a federated state of Europe, while the Common Agricultural Policy was unpopular and expensive for consumers. Wilson, then back in power, sought to restore the relationship with Washington. Callaghan, who was shortly to replace him, developed a good rapport with President Carter. This led to the development of the NATO Long Term Defence Programme and the decision to deploy intermediate range nuclear missiles in Britain.

European Allies followed the twists and turns of the Carter Administration with disquiet. Despite the agreement to deploy Pershing 2 in Western Europe, the Europeans, led by the Germans, wished to press on with *détente* and were less concerned than the United States about Soviet expansionism in the Pacific and Asia. The result was the 'dual-track' decision to press

ahead with missile deployment while simultaneously seeking arms reductions. A few weeks later, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and Carter withdrew from SALT II. This sudden shift in policy was profoundly unsettling. Even so, there was a suspicion in London that the threat to the United States' security interests was being exaggerated to enhance Carter's chances of re-election. America was unresponsive to offers of mediation.

Both British and American diplomacy had displayed a similar lack of direction; both nations were shaken by recession. The wider implications of the steps to recovery served to push them further apart. The ethnic balance in America, which had assimilated waves of immigration from eastern and southern Europe and the Latin states, was changing. In the seventies, 40 per cent of immigrants had come from Asia and another 40 per cent from Central and South America. Even those Americans who naturally looked more towards Europe felt dismay at the state of Britain. Two Governments had been brought down by the trade union movement. Britain seemed impossible to govern in the winter of 1978-9. The direct rule that had been imposed in Northern Ireland in 1972, in response to escalating sectarian violence, was still in effect, and devolution for Scotland and Wales had been under serious discussion. Many American conservatives pointed to conditions in Britain as an indictment of socialism, Keynesianism and the welfare state. They were the very vices to which, they judged, America had become dangerously attached.<sup>33</sup> Britain had become used to America no longer taking her seriously as a world power, but it was deeply distressing to realise that she was losing her reputation for political sagacity.<sup>34</sup>

## **POLARIS AND TRIDENT**

The key issue for the late seventies was the replacement for Polaris. The divisions within the Callaghan government provided the harbinger for the close relationship between President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher. The personal warmth of this relationship allowed Thatcher to play a strong role in world affairs in the knowledge that, usually, she could assume the President's support. For both leaders, the central tenet was freedom that, they believed, was

threatened at home and abroad. Facing intense opposition, they leaned on each other for support to reverse Keynesianism and *détente* and to rekindle national pride. For Thatcher, America was English-speaking, a free-enterprise society and fervently anti-Communist, whilst Europe seemed disunited, left-wing and irredeemably foreign.<sup>35</sup> At the heart of Thatcher foreign policy was the renewal of the British nuclear special relationship. In 1980, it was announced that Britain would indeed purchase Trident C-4 missiles from the United States, an agreement made previously with Carter. Although an upgrade to the C-4 capability exceeded British deterrent needs, in 1982, Thatcher arranged for the D-5 missile instead to maintain harmony with Washington's national guidelines for United States forces. This close co-operation in the nuclear community is remarkable.

There seems to be no evidence to support the proposition put forward by Kissinger that nuclear weapons detract from alliances since preponderant power can be achieved alone.<sup>36</sup> In the case of Britain and the United States, not only have both states had nuclear weapons with little weakening in their alliance, the growing capability and sophistication of the lesser advanced of the two has resulted in greater, rather than lesser intimacy in the military partnership.<sup>37</sup> The relationship is firm and will remain so at least as long as Trident remains in service. For many observers, however, the upgrade for Trident, despite the lessons of Skybolt, was a stark indication of the consequences of Britain's continuing dependence on the United States.<sup>38</sup> Despite the paradox that the deal provided a weapon that would be used, if at all, only when the relationship had broken down, it displays again the ability of the relationship to bounce back just when it was being written off.

## **AMBIGUITIES**

Ambiguities continued with disputes over the Falklands War, Grenada, spy scandals, steel exports, the Soviet pipeline, cruise missile dual key arrangements and a failure by Britain to make a contribution to the western rapid reaction force.

In the Falklands War, the United States was slow to support Britain. Washington announced that it was a friend to both countries. Reagan talked about 'even-handedness' in a way reminiscent of Heath in 1970. London was dismayed, unsympathetic and angry despite the fact that Washington was faced with a genuine conflict of interest. The Argentine junta was the lynch-pin of its anti-Communist strategy in Latin America. For the Thatcher government, fundamental issues were at stake, British sovereignty, the rights of the islanders to self-determination and the illegal use of force. The Pentagon, however, had been backing Britain from the start and the aid increased dramatically once America came off the fence. This help was given without any special or formal agreement. Assistance, beyond that which might have been offered to another NATO ally, was freely given. Even so, for all the rhetoric about "alliance" and "friendship" Britain had still acted without consultation. It was Reagan's turn to respond in any manner that minimised damage to the United States.<sup>39</sup>

In October 1983 a similar tension arose, but this time it was the Americans who acted over Grenada, a member of the British Commonwealth. Objections from London were ignored. President Reagan was said to be surprised and a little disappointed at the Thatcher reaction. This was seen as a bitter humiliation for Thatcher, suggesting that she had little influence in Washington. Healey, Labour's shadow Foreign Secretary, claimed that she "had made something of a cult of the special relationship with the American President, at the expense of British interests, of her relations with our European partners, and our relationship with the Commonwealth." Lambasting her "servility to the American President" he dubbed her Reagan's "obedient poodle."<sup>40</sup> For some, it also provided further proof of the inadequacy of the existing controls over the cruise missiles about to be deployed on British territory. From the British government point of view, the Anglo-American relationship remained fundamental to defending British interests. However, Thatcher, by increasing her criticism of the Grenadian intervention, set boundaries and gave notice that interests would diverge if the conflicts in Lebanon and Nicaragua were to increase or if arms sales to Argentina were to be resumed. Washington was surprised at Mrs Thatcher's belligerence two weeks after the event; some have argued that relations were worse then than over Suez.<sup>41</sup>

Despite the rows, the special defence relationship remained close. Nonetheless, both the Falklands war and the Grenada operation had shown the growing importance to the United States of relationships outside the Atlantic alliance, particularly in Latin America. They also highlighted the fact that, ever since World War II, the relationship had been asymmetrical. America mattered far more to Britain than Britain mattered to America. The underlying question, which haunted Thatcher, was whether she was leaving Britain too dependent on the United States and too remote from Europe who collectively might have the power to keep the trans-Atlantic relationship in balance.<sup>42</sup>

In 1983 President Reagan launched SDI. This held little attraction for Western Europeans since, if America became secure, the risk of its 'decoupling' its own defence from that of Europe would increase. Thatcher's approach to SDI was a classic example of the British concept of the special relationship, namely trying to influence America discreetly in private rather than carping noisily in public. This was the opposite of the French approach that publicly questioned the scheme and proposed a European alternative.<sup>43</sup>

The Falklands war had forced President Reagan to choose between friends. The most dramatic example of Thatcher's identification with the United States rather than Europe came in 1986 when she repaid the compliment by allowing British bases to be used for retaliatory strikes against Libya. Less than three months earlier, she had said, "I must warn you that I do not believe in retaliatory strikes that are against international law .... Once you start going across borders, then I do not see an end to it. And I uphold international law very firmly."<sup>44</sup> American opinion supported the President's action, and Mrs Thatcher was applauded. The French were roundly condemned for refusing to allow over-flying, as was the European community, who spent days arguing about sanctions. However, opinion polls in Britain suggested that two-thirds of the people opposed British involvement. Thatcher's critics were also able to add to her embarrassment when the arms for hostages and Irangate scandals broke around Reagan. As

Heath had done in 1973, she could have demurred over Libya, but the debt over the Falklands was too strong.<sup>45</sup>

The Reagan - Thatcher era ended in January 1989 when President Bush was inaugurated. John Major replaced Mrs Thatcher in November 1990. In his early years, Bush put Germany as his first foreign policy priority in Europe, but some commentators have seen a subsequent reversion towards Britain because of the Gulf War. Major came to power intent on demonstrating good Europeanism, while believing that more integration in Europe was in no way incompatible with an Atlantic outlook. Britain's contribution of an armoured division as well as air power to the United States led coalition provided a further example of harmony of operational purpose and achievement of an over-riding common objective. Later, in January 1993, when air power was used against Saddam Hussein to force him to abide with the terms of the Gulf cease-fire, there were disagreements between the Allies over target priorities. Major prevailed over Bush and several of the more sensitive targets were dropped from the strike plan. When questioned by the world press after the strikes, Major was then able to be unequivocal in his support for the American-led operation whilst the French expressed strong public disquiet and questioned the legitimacy of the air operation.

More recently there have been more examples of divergence of opinion. London was forced to ask the Bush administration publicly to be more cautious in discussing the need to enforce the 'no-fly' zone in Bosnia because of possible retaliation against British troops. The Clinton administration, whilst espousing a free trade policy, is taking protectionist measures. This has led to continuing frustration in London over Washington's attitude to the GATT talks, and their seeming failure to accept that G7 co-ordination of economic policies has suffered and needs to be revived. The absence of an external threat has allowed Americans to concentrate on domestic issues.

## **UNRAVELLING HISTORY**

Acquiescence runs so deep that many Americans consider themselves experts on the British and vice-versa. This is the consequence of a common language, a shared history, wartime collaboration, intermarriage, the telephone and television.<sup>46</sup> Should this be true, the relationship should portray a persistent convergence towards cordiality but there seems to have been no automatic Anglo-Saxon alliance. Nonetheless, whilst it is dangerous to generalise, there has been a consistent closeness and familiarity that has set the relationship apart. Familiarity is not enough. Relationships between states are driven by the interaction of the political and psychological, economic, and military elements of national power. It is a subtle combination of these elements that allow a state to act in its 'national interest' when executing foreign policy.

### **POLITICAL THREADS**

The consultative links forged in the war years remain strong. There are fewer secrets or 'taboo' subjects than with other countries. Kissinger has spoken of a "pattern of consultation so matter-of-factly intimate that it became psychologically impossible to ignore British views."<sup>47</sup> General Sir Peter de la Billière, after the Gulf War, recalled the quotation, "The fact that the relationship can be taken for granted in Washington is, paradoxically, an earnest of its fundamental importance."<sup>48</sup> The tendency is to minimise differences rather than exaggerate them. Where there have been fundamental crises, they can be traced, in part, to a falter in the habit of consultation. Despite recurring criticism, all British ministries maintain a substantial Washington presence in the mini-Whitehall on Massachusetts Avenue.

The power that accrued to the United States from the Second World War made isolationism impossible. This new strength could have been directed to the Pacific and Japan, but the British connection drew it into Europe and the NATO Alliance.<sup>49</sup> This relationship was crucial in shaping the post war world, but soon after 1945 it was no longer possible to pretend



that the relationship was among equals. As one power grew and the other declined, both sought to redefine their place in the world. The degree of inequality has increased over time; this raises the question of the relative importance of the relationship to each country and the degree to which it meets mutual needs. At the end of the war, Britain was a full member of the victorious team and, with help with nuclear technology, an illusion of great power status has remained. This has complicated Britain's adjustment as a middle ranking European power. The contrast with France, who is strengthening her European personality and is accelerating the pace of EC integration, is striking.<sup>50</sup>

The personalities of political leaders have placed a strong stamp on the relationship. However, the importance of these links should not be exaggerated since relations between countries are essentially decided by their national interests. Even so, each country has leaders who are intent on their own priorities and on negotiations to advance them. Since comprehension of another's actual behaviour is a function of one's own concerns and expectations, in dealing with a habitual friend, when expectations converge, an alliance works but, when they diverge, crises occur. Misconceptions make for crises in direct proportion to the intimacy of the relationship.<sup>51</sup> Often Britain has had to accept whatever help the Americans were willing to offer, for example, trading destroyers for bases, Imperial Preference for financial aid, or Polaris for Holy Loch.<sup>52</sup> The warmth of the relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt could not disguise differences, particularly after 1943, as America became the dominant partner in the Alliance. Similarly, whilst Thatcher and Reagan enjoyed close relations as fellows in the battle against communism and meddling by government, there were strains below the surface.

Close personal relations can matter in moments of tension. MacMillan's personal influence was crucial in persuading Kennedy, in December 1962, to agree to provide Polaris at a time when the State Department wanted to end Britain's nuclear role. During the eighties, Thatcher intervened several times to influence the Reagan administration on arms control. The relationship between Bush and Major has not been seen as carrying any particular significance and, at the end of the Bush administration, their relationship was business-like and in good

shape. Nonetheless, whilst their relationship was not particularly close, it was politically effective. By providing for the Gulf War the largest contingent of military forces from Europe, the Britain fulfilled United States expectations of a strong ally and reinforced American belief in the special relationship.

Common interests appear to have been of crucial importance, whilst shared party ideologies and affiliation seem to have had only a limited influence. The MacMillan - Eisenhower relationship was a success, but Tory MacMillan also enjoyed a fruitful and friendly relationship with Democrat Kennedy. Fellow conservatives Nixon and Heath never got on well, in part because the prime minister pushed British policy firmly into a European rather than an Atlantic direction. The Democrat Johnson never respected Socialist Wilson because of his attitude to Vietnam.

For some American observers, the main criticism levelled at the relationship is that too much emphasis has been given by the government to it and, as a result, the United States has lost sight of its real interests in a strong and united Europe. They also argue that the aim of preventing nuclear proliferation has been damaged.<sup>53</sup> The relative decline in Britain's power probably was a factor in the erosion of the relationship in the seventies, but seems not to have been a major cause for dissension. In diplomatic terms, Britain has been able to provide some compensation by providing expertise and European intervention to buttress western and alliance interests. The history of the relationship also seems to support the proposition that small powers usually exert disproportionate power in alliance bargaining in exchange for some loss of independence. For example, the growing dependence of Britain in the nuclear and intelligence fields has given the United States considerable influence over British security policy. She is thus likely to be more amenable to American views on major diplomatic issues.

## **ECONOMIC THREADS**

Perhaps the most important measure of a nation's power potential is its economic capacity. In contrast to the more recent drive towards collective security, which originated in the formation of NATO in 1948, between the wars, without a common enemy, economic rivalry between America and Britain became intense. Since a state's political stability, and the durability of its leadership, seems increasingly tied to domestic economic performance, there is new potential for increasing tension between Britain and America over their singular and joint relationships with the EC since America's budget and trade crises are not solved. To some extent, this may prove creative, allowing Britain to play an interpretative or intermediary role.

## **MILITARY THREADS**

The continuing perception of a regional and global threat to common interests has been of major importance in creating and sustaining the military partnership between the two countries. It also seems that the defence relationship was at its closest when the threat seemed greatest. This was particularly so in the late forties, late fifties, early sixties and early eighties. Events of the seventies suggest that the corollary is also true. In the era of superpower *détente*, the cohesiveness of the bilateral alliance began to erode. Although defence relations have followed other general trends, some areas of defence such as in nuclear and intelligence fields, have been out of tune and continue unabated. This suggests a pragmatic approach when benefits can be seen to outweigh other difficulties. The Korean war provides an example of military co-operation where British vital interests were not directly threatened and the Falklands War an example of the United States backing Britain when forced to choose between conflicting interests.

In material terms, Britain has received much from a communion that was the cornerstone of British foreign policy. In the nuclear field, for example, a relationship was cemented that no other ally of the United States was allowed to enjoy. This intimate nuclear relationship does not

extend to the conventional arms fields where the most significant areas of joint development in weapon systems have been European (Tornado, EFA, Trigat). Bi-lateral success has usually occurred when one country has bought off-the-shelf from the other, such as with Harrier AV-8 for the Marine Corps. The United States prefers self-sufficiency and co-operates more when political imperatives bite rather than through material need. The gains the United States has derived have often been more intangible, but tangible benefits have included bases in Britain, the use of Christmas Island for weapon tests, aircraft carrier technology, VSTOL aircraft and reactive 'Chobham' armour.<sup>54</sup> In the future, dwindling United States resources may increase the political pressure to co-operate, but this is more likely to be with Europe as a whole, than with any nation in particular.

Britain has been a permissive home for the USAF. Different, and often controversial, capabilities such as B-29, Thor and GLCM have come and gone. However, the importance of American basing in Britain has decreased as other allies accepted the presence of American troops. With the collapse of the Soviet threat a wide retrenchment is on the way. Airfields close, leaving only Alconbury, Lakenheath and Mildenhall open. However, the base closures, which are part of the general reduction in Europe, have been accompanied by an upgrading of capability. A new concentration of airborne special forces in Britain may reflect a perception that, if such capabilities are to be deployed outside the NATO area, Britain may be a more permissive base than Germany. The need for forward submarine support is diminishing; the last United States submarine left Holy Loch in November 1991. However, there is still close co-operation between navies notably through the strategic nuclear connection and co-ordinated operations for sea control in the Atlantic. The United States army has limited its logistic support to five bases that are scheduled for further reduction. Britain's role as a transit point for American forces is seen to be no longer necessary while the threat of a European war recedes.

Although the closeness achieved during the second world war was bound to fade, it has left an enduring legacy. The formal structure that exists today seems little different from that shared between Britain and her other allies, however, "in times of crisis and tension, where there

is a mutually perceived need for joint military support, the essential closeness of the two military establishments asserts itself with an ease that can be breathtaking."<sup>55</sup> During the Gulf War about 100 British officers were integrated into the United States command system to the extent of wearing American uniforms.<sup>56</sup> The way bi-lateral military business, exemplified by B-29 basing and the Falklands War, is conducted has given it unique resilience. The bonds remain strong. They are largely unaffected by political ups and downs since, except for nuclear matters, they seldom touch the strategic issues of the day.

## **HISTORICAL MODELS**

Two possible models emerge from history and reflect periods of divergent and convergent interests. The relationship of the seventies showed the strategic partnership at its weakest when the United States was pursuing vital interests that Britain did not share. *Détente* and *Ost-politik* were in the European air. There was a general lack of direction on both sides of the Atlantic and an underlying feeling that Britain was no longer important enough to be special to the United States despite defence links remaining intact. In contrast, the relationship of the eighties was transformed by the powerful personalities of two leaders. Britain's position had not really changed. She acted with greater confidence, a confidence buttressed by the United States, and again seen as the most faithful and committed ally of the United States against the Soviet Union.

## **LOOKING AHEAD**

### **THE PLAYERS IN THE PARTNERSHIP**

#### **United States.**

Some argue that the United States is a superpower in relative decline and draw close comparisons with Britain in the late nineteenth century. Distracted by global military and diplomatic responsibilities, the argument runs, the United States has neglected its economy and

ignored its festering social problems. Hardly anyone doubts that there is a lot wrong with contemporary America. Lack of access to health care, inner-city poverty, racial discrimination and levels of crime are all signs of a malfunctioning society. The broader thesis of 'declining superpower' is less compelling. Japan was the only country to advance relatively to the United States during the eighties. The leading European countries failed to make any relative headway; (west) Germany ended the decade with living standards about 15 per cent lower than America. The United States is not alone in experiencing slower productivity growth, but it has retained a large absolute advantage. It has a low population density and so can benefit from liberal immigration policies; it has a younger population than Japan or the European countries meaning that it faces a less acute fiscal challenge through population ageing. It is better endowed with raw materials and capital than most of its competitors and has the most extensive higher education system. It also has the lowest per capita tax burden of any OECD country, bar Turkey, and therefore there is room for expanding its tax base.<sup>57</sup>

The perception of decline partly reflects a confusion with growing inequality; the benefits of economic growth have accrued mainly to the top 30 per cent of the population. It may also have been partly media driven as successive academics and journalists found an incentive in denigrating the United States as a way to discredit recurring Republican administrations. A new energetic President, with the same party controlling both the administration and the Congress, may provide a more positive environment for a re-birth of self-confidence.

It seems, therefore, that there is no reason, other than through a lack of national will, why the United States could not successfully assume the mantle of world leadership. Superficially this is straightforward. A strong foreign policy is needed. Inevitably the scope of such interest will be world-wide, whether as a willing or unwilling participant, since the United States bears a weight of expectation in world affairs that the Bush administration had generally been prepared to carry (leadership in the Gulf War and in Somalia), although with limits (Yugoslavia). For the future, the question will be whether this global perspective will be maintained and what the place of Europe, and the place of Britain within Europe, will be in the

United States' view of the world. While it is likely that traditional interests in open markets, a stable security structure, including eastern European states, and a general interest in opposing chaos and genocide will pertain, the problem of how America could lead the world, without becoming its policeman, will remain. If European nations are unable, or unwilling, to help to uphold these values as a group, it will become increasingly likely that the United States will look towards Britain for help.

### **Britain.**

For Britain, stocktaking is more difficult. Set against her decline in economic power is her continuing retention of a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council, which she is in no hurry to surrender, and the maintenance on her nuclear weapon capability. The question of whether she has yet come fully to terms with her reduced status remains open. Winston Churchill spoke of Britain at the centre of three concentric circles, the Atlantic, Europe and the Commonwealth. In October 1991, Major said that Britain, alone among nations, stood at the nub of three interlocking alliances: NATO, the European Community and the Commonwealth.<sup>58</sup> Such a statement reinforces a persistent British unwillingness to abandon a global perspective, even if her capacity to direct events has diminished.

In a speech at the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House in London on 27 January 1993 entitled 'The New Disorder' Douglas Hurd, the Foreign Secretary, set out the government views of Britain's future role. He sought to deflate imperial pretensions of those who have argued that the end of the Cold War should presage an international crusade for peace and justice by Britain. "Obviously, we cannot be everywhere, and we cannot do everything. Our diplomacy is now undermanned compared with that of our main colleagues and competitors. Our armed forces are already over stretched."<sup>59</sup> He suggested that Britain would be prepared to continue to contribute towards a bigger international effort to combat disorder, but within strict limits and in support of clear-sighted objectives.

His implicit plea was that America not only had a good friend in Britain but that she was a friend that the Clinton administration would need. This partly explains British irritation with recurring American proposals to reorganise the Security Council,<sup>60</sup> which might threaten Britain's permanent seat. The foreign secretary's explicit message was that America cannot stand back and concentrate on domestic problems. "Every major international enterprise will continue to need American support, and probably American participation." America also has to come to terms with her expanded United Nations role. America is needed above all in view of Hurd's warning that "an effort comparable to those of 1815, 1919 and the years after 1945, is needed if the international community is to avert a continuing slide into disorder."<sup>61</sup>

## **THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA**

The agenda is crowded. Whilst the partners are normally regarded as the agents of stability, Britain is engaged in a process of European integration that could transform her essential nature whilst the United States is coming to terms with being the only remaining superpower with economic prospects that are, at best, uncertain.

### **New World Order**

In the Cold War days, the 'west' had a stated interest in world order. That concept of world order is now, in a sense, the only concept of world order left. As the victor, the west has even more responsibility for taking on global issues; it seems that winning of peace will be no less difficult. Despite the dramatic impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is no evidence to suggest a fracture in historical trends; it is likely, therefore, that the world's nations will continue to act within the broad pattern of the ideological, political and economic framework that became most noticeable towards the end of the twentieth century, but less divisively than in the past.<sup>62</sup>



The bi-polar pattern of international relations, which formed the centre of gravity of the Cold War period and the strategy of containment, has been dismantled. In many ways, the international system has come full circle, returning to the post World War II vision of the co-operation between Allies and the ascendancy of the United Nations.<sup>63</sup> There are also similarities with the era immediately prior to World War I. Thus, while capitalism is not wholly secure around the world, there is an underlying feeling of security. Since it is difficult to construct a definitive and cohesive threat, there seems to be a 'peace dividend' to be put to more worthy uses, and a time for leisured investment. Within the Western democracies, if social complacency is coupled with a further weakening of the influence of organised labour in such a way that avenues for the representation of opinion are reduced, a new wave of radicalism from the left, or from an unfulfilled middle class, can be expected. There is an underlying danger of internal unrest.

Externally, the full significance of the end of the Cold War is only slowly being realised. The first shock wave of the break-up of the Soviet Union has created a score of new countries, toppled governments, shattered the Old World order and expanded the United Nations both in size and influence.<sup>64</sup> Many new states can only be identified by historians. It is the end of the simple world. The problems of the dissolution of the Russian Empire are as great as those that accompanied the fall of either the Austro-Hungarian or Ottoman Empires. The ramifications of the fall of those empires are still being played out in the Balkans today. Unlike the 19th Century however, when the stability of the nation state was predicated on strong armies and the threat of war, unilateral disarmament - a form of peace with complacency - will weaken nationhood and stimulate the assertion of regionalism. It is hardly certain that the nation state system will survive since the whole sixteenth and seventeenth century idea of absolute sovereignty is being eroded by technology, economic interdependence and supra-national bodies such as the United Nations and the European Community.

The evolution of a new European security arrangement is in its infancy. History shows that the break-up of Great Empires is usually accompanied by violence. However, transition in

the Soviet Union remains unique, for the present, since the state has caved in without war, revolution or invasion. There is no reason to suggest that the decay of the Russian empire will remain an exception in the longer term. Further reactions are possible as part of more assertive and more nationalistic positions. The first sign of this danger would be a declining Russian relationship with its former republics. In a wider context, old grievances founded in nationalism and the impositions of unnatural political boundaries are re-emerging, fuelled by the differential impact of Third World prosperity. Problems of population and migration, nationalism and sovereignty and the fundamental problem of dealing with 'failed' nation states are likely to increase. This is of particular significance to security, since those who prosper are more likely to support discipline in the international order, while those who are excluded from prosperity are less likely to be 'western' and democratic. They have little incentive to conform.<sup>65</sup> Threats to security will therefore appear lower in intensity but broader in scope.

The Third World remains volatile, despite the removal of Communist support for 'wars of national liberation', with struggles for political power spilling into confrontation. Insurgency continues in many Third World countries where superpower involvement has, in the past, been the catalyst. However, the hearts of Third World problems are political and cluster around resource limitation, disputed borders and nationalism. While there is no doubt that Russia has exploited these influences, as a way of weakening the will of countries to resist the spread of Communism, her direct intervention probably accounted for no more than some of the trouble.<sup>66</sup> Conflict is bound to increase because of a world breakdown of homogeneity.<sup>67</sup> This instability will be aggravated as peoples respond to a future potentially filled by foreign debt, an imbalance between population increase and the availability of food, grinding poverty, undeveloped economies, educational deficiencies, political instability and environmental degradation.<sup>68</sup> The end of the Cold War, therefore, does not portend an end to threats, more likely their diffusion.<sup>69</sup>

It is too early to tell whether the Soviet break-up is beneficial or harmful. With luck, it can increase freedom and prosperity; with bad luck it could lead to a huge increase in local conflict and the numbers of countries with nuclear weapons. Either way, the end of the Soviet

empire makes the world a more diverse, more unstable and a more unpredictable place<sup>70</sup> and therefore one where a close and unambiguous relationship between traditional allies may find an increasing role.

## **The Place Of NATO**

For the United States, NATO provides a leadership opportunity, and therefore influence in the security of western Europe. It is one of the few fora in which the United States can speak to Europe as a fellow member. For Britain, the NATO structure provides an opportunity to sustain a greater role in European security than her declining power might otherwise warrant. It is therefore not surprising that both nations are strongly committed to its preservation. Britain continues to regard NATO as the "essential framework for safeguarding the freedom and security of its members."<sup>71</sup> France's policy is confusing. Her military expresses support for the trans-Atlantic link whilst her politicians seem unwilling to accept the American dominance in European security that NATO provides. She is therefore unhappy about broadening the political roles of the alliance. Her compromise is the creation of a European defence identity as insurance against what she sees as an inevitable withdrawal of United States forces and therefore, its leadership and influence. German support for the United States connection is, in many ways, as strong as Britain's. However, this too seems complicated by another strong desire to proceed towards political union with France with a German motor at its heart. Italy has also tried to reconcile purely European and NATO policies. She has a dislike for the developing Franco-German axis that she shares with Britain. She is well pleased, however, to have persuaded the British to accept that political union has a defence dimension. Other allies range across the spectrum.

Despite these differences of position, NATO received a strong affirmation at the Rome Summit in November 1991. NATO proclaimed a new strategic concept, "A new chapter in the history of the Alliance .... as an agent of change, a source of stability and the indispensable guarantor of its members' security, our Alliance will continue to play a key role in building a

new, lasting order of peace in Europe.”<sup>72</sup> The Treaty also affirms continuity since “the new environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but underlines its continuing validity.”<sup>73</sup> Changes are portrayed as evolutionary rather than revolutionary with nothing excluded from the agenda. There is recognition that security has political, economic, social and environmental aspects and the Treaty states that “The new Europe cannot be comprehensively addressed by one institution alone, but by a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America.” Difficulties with operations out of the NATO area are unresolved.

The Rome Summit could be said to represent only an extension to the traditional Anglo-American view of the Alliance since it reaffirmed the ‘essential transatlantic link’, the need for a continuing mix of both conventional and nuclear forces and the need to broaden activities with eastern European neighbours. Broadly it seems that Britain was successful in marshalling European support for positions that the United States also endorsed; however, there was less need for the United States to exert the pressure that, for some nations, would have been unwelcome. Since the British position could be taken for granted, it was the German position that was crucial. French problem-making, which traditionally often threatens to unravel the Alliance, meant that Germany was pulled in both directions. Rome has settled the question, for the time being at least, as to whether the Alliance should continue to exist. Nevertheless, there are outstanding questions on the degree to which the treaty was purely cosmetic, how much of the cost of the transatlantic relationship the Europeans should bear and to what degree security can be expressed through defence alone. Bush, then President, was reported as saying, “Our premise is that the American role in the defense and the affairs of Europe will not be made superfluous by European union.”<sup>74</sup>

The formation and command structure of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) reinforce a British/United States heart for NATO. The next chairman of the Military Committee is also to be British. However, a wider ranging review of the NATO command structure has reduced British ‘over-representation’. This confirms that power cannot be separated from

participation and cautions that declining American troop strengths will reduce its influence and bring its continuing leadership of the Alliance increasingly into question. It also shows a new willingness by the United States to support a German over a British position. This is sensible since both Britain and America need Germany to be satisfied with the way NATO is developing.

There are imposed limits to the broadening process. Doubts persist about the relevance of NATO to real-world security problems in Europe. NATO neither encompasses the totality of political relations between the transatlantic community and its eastern neighbours nor addresses all the issues that link each side of the transatlantic relationship. The United States has recognised that its relationship with Europe is increasingly multi-dimensional, and provision has been made for bi-annual consultation at Presidential, Secretary of State and Commission/Cabinet level in the Transatlantic Declaration on European Community/United States Relations agreed on 23 November 1992. For the United States, this is a difference between being consulted and being a member of the 'home team'. Britain crosses to the other side of the table to sit with neighbours from whom she has often felt isolated. Inevitably the special relationship is increasingly being fashioned within this wider European context.

## **European Security**

For centuries, the main fear of European statesmen has been the deliberate use of force by one powerful state to establish dominance over the rest. Now, suddenly, that threat has disappeared almost completely, and in its place has come the danger of a complete break-down of order on western Europe's periphery. There is a threat of nuclear or chemical fallout if unconventional weapons are used in the former Soviet Union, together with increasing evidence that widespread pollution caused by industrial malpractice, or poor nuclear reactor design and maintenance,<sup>75</sup> could herald fresh disasters like Chernobyl. The collapse of the Red Army and the Soviet defence industry increases the danger of weapon proliferation and more dangerous arms reaching dictators or terrorists. Both in eastern Europe and in the Mahgreb, the lack of security is forcing more people to migrate westwards and northwards. Western Europe could

absorb them economically in compensation for its own declining birth rate, but not without straining its social and political structures to breaking point. There are also risks of being sucked into others' quarrels as former national frontiers dissolve and coalitions spring up based on ethnic solidarity or on the old adage 'my enemy's enemy is my friend'. Greece and Turkey are on opposite sides in Yugoslavia. Thus, European nations must be very careful in pursuing their interests.<sup>76</sup>

Nuclear matters are complicating dimensions. France has speculated about the possibility of a Euro-nuclear doctrine, but this is not an issue where France and Germany can call the tune. Instead it brings together France and Britain, although they may not agree on the way forward. However, such an extension to the nuclear dimension could raise new and fundamental questions about the heart of the relationship with the US.

With Europe in such a state of flux, the questions arise of how much can and should Europeans be responsible for their own security, and what should characterise the European Defence Identity (EDI). The Maastricht Treaty, yet unratified, proposes that "The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the European Union, including framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence." Britain initially opposed this vision of EDI but accepted an ultimate defence role for the European Community. Although the detail of the evolution process is yet far from clear, the Western European Union (WEU) has been selected as the EDI vehicle with Prime Minister Major announcing to Parliament, "We should build up the WEU as the defence pillar of the European Union."<sup>77</sup> The United States lacks leverage in this debate. From its viewpoint, it is better for Britain to be on the inside, and at the centre, rather than outside as a negotiator. The United States and British views on the development of European security are very close although there is frustration in the American camp that a single agency to lead EDI has not emerged. Of more importance is the danger of portraying the development of EDI as a traditional battle between Anglo-American versus Franco-German views. Building partnerships with like-minded Europeans is a more important task than flaunting ideas of any special

relationship. British influence will depend on the extent she can be seen to be espousing a strong body of European opinion.

A key paragraph <sup>78</sup> in the Strategic Concept is capable of comforting both the instinctive atlanticists and the enthusiastic europeanisers by stating that:

“In the new security environment and given the reduced overall force levels in future, the ability to work closely together, which will facilitate the cost effective use of Alliance resources, will be particularly important for the achievement of the missions of the Allies’ forces. The Alliance’s collective defence arrangements in which, for those concerned, the integrated military structure, including multi-national forces, plays the key role, will be essential in this regard. Integrated and multi-national structures, as they are further identified in the context of an emerging European Defence Identity, will also have a similarly important role to play in enhancing the Allies’ ability to work together in the common defence. Allies’ efforts to achieve maximum co-operation will be based on the common guidelines for defence outlined above. Practical arrangements will be developed to ensure the necessary mutual transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity and the Alliance.”

The United States and Britain are firmly in the former camp setting the security part of EDI in the WEU but keeping the collective defence part firmly in a NATO context. Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd remarked that “the best, cheapest and safest way to organise European defence is in close alliance with the United States.”<sup>79</sup> France, with support from Germany, can interpret it as giving the alliance’s blessing to European structures that, though not inimical to NATO, are not dependent on it either. The Franco-German Corps concept therefore may legitimately place forces under the operational control of SACEUR. While progressing with internal reform, there is a need for Russia, and the eastern states, to find their rightful place since those central and eastern European countries that have no organic or permanent connection with Russia will inevitable look westward for investment markets. Germany, with the strongest economy and being the nearest, is best placed to lead.

Britain sees the WEU, a security organisation, as the essential framework for operations outside the NATO area, though not necessarily out of Europe. However, British eyes also have difficulty envisioning any major European military action without United States involvement both for political and military reasons. Hence there was British concern over the apparent lack of support in Washington for European actions in the former Yugoslavia. Whilst military involvement in Somalia showed a continuing willingness by the Bush administration to commit forces abroad, the lack of reaction, beyond limited humanitarian aid, suggests that the United States wants to remain detached from security matters in Europe that do not involve Russia.

It was perhaps inevitable that the Rome outcome would become all things to all men. Europe must now develop towards a constitutional structure in which the powers of the union would be defined and circumscribed and those of states protected by judicial power. Without this structure, it is possible to surmise that the central power is liable to expand until the peoples of Europe revolt against it with the danger that they would pull down the entire edifice in the process. The outcome would be unpredictable. If no European union capable of meeting challenges comes into existence, nation states will have to cope with them separately and will, almost inevitably, come into varying degrees of conflict with each other. Among these nation states, Germany would be the strongest. For others to avoid falling under German domination, they would have to band together in a time-honoured anti-German alliance. If Britain and France led such an alliance, it would be hard to imagine that Germany would allow them a monopoly on nuclear weapons.<sup>80</sup> A nuclear-armed Germany could frighten the former Soviet Union into reunification and rearmament. At best, a balance of terror would be created and, at worst, there could be a downward slide towards a new European war. Those who share such a vision encourage continued involvement by the United States in Europe.

### **Beyond The NATO Area**

British responsibilities, but not her perceptions of them, have shrunk. Her residual responsibilities are small but widespread with garrisons in the South Atlantic, Hong Kong,



Belize, Brunei, Cyprus, Ascension, Diego Garcia and a naval presence around the Caribbean and in the Gulf. British Army deployment around the world is shown in Figure 1. Of more significance than the detail is the demonstration of her continuing willingness to deploy military forces around the world to deal with crises either unilaterally, under United Nations auspices, or as part of a multi-national coalition. She feels well skilled in the diplomatic art. Her Gulf contribution of 35,000 ground troops, 69 combat aircraft and 15 ships was the second only to the United States and did not go unnoticed. This enhanced her trusted ally status. The Gulf deployment confirms that Britain and America tend to see world issues in a similar light and will commit military forces when important interests are at stake. Britain's willingness to take action outside the NATO area, her influence with other European nations and her diplomatic strength in the United Nations provide three sound reasons for the United States to maintain the special relationship.




Figure 1

The United States' relationships elsewhere are more clouded. France has a similar global perspective to Britain and has no difficulty in deploying troops to support residual interests in Africa. She contributed 13,500 ground troops, 42 aircraft and 13 ships to the Gulf War.<sup>81</sup> Italy is playing a significant part in Somalia. Germany is largely constrained from flexing the military arm of its foreign policy since she seems politically unable to deploy troops outside the NATO area. She made a large financial contribution to the Gulf War. However such support, whilst welcome, carries less weight than putting lives at risk.

### **PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE**

From several angles the relationship is in good order. London and Washington share views on the role of NATO and the conceptual evolution of EDI. The political relationship is good, although at times clouded by Britain's place in Europe, and the specialist defence ties in the nuclear and intelligence fields are firmly in place. The sum of these bonds shows more than a cordial friendship between democracies; the relationship has a unique value with distinctive roles and common objectives. Nonetheless, value judgements may differ between the countries, and the objectives may be frustrated by such changes in the environment as the inauguration of a new President.

Prime Minister Major and President Clinton may only be a few years apart in age, but they are very different people with widely contrasting experiences. They may, in time, get on well. Both are committed politicians interested in detailed policy-making. If there are uncertainties in London about how to approach the new administration, it is not so much about ideology as about personal unfamiliarity. For Clinton, the priority seems to be at home. It is too early to say whether there is any significance in the fact that Major was the first European leader to meet Clinton, as President, face-to-face on 27 February 1993 despite requests from other nations for audiences. Major's priority is in his policy in Western Europe. During the Cold War western diplomats and military planners could tell themselves that they were working within the same global framework. This is no longer necessarily so. Clinton's natural instinct will be to deal

with Europe as a region and the European Community as the regional organisation rather than with Britain bi-laterally. There is therefore a need for Britain to find out how responsive to calls the new administration is going to be.

Despite some academic pressure to dismiss the values of culture, language and history to the relationship, it is still true that both countries share a commitment to democracy and freedom, enjoy easy communication and have a feeling of shared heritage and a global perspective. For the United States, Britain is seen generally as a source of support and as a trusted ally with whom views will more often converge than diverge. However, democratic values are already more widely spread, and the international world is increasing speaking English. The United States is becoming ethnically more diverse and looking more to the Pacific than the Atlantic. Europe, without the traditional Communist threat, seems self-evidently no more important than other regions. However, if America looks both east and west simultaneously, it should see an echo of the inter-war years with Japan and Germany on the rise and Russia on the ropes. Within Britain there is a strong streak of instinctive atlanticism and a feeling of being not quite European. Against this, Britain is increasing her European identity from which she cannot escape. Her interests, such as in GATT, will increasingly be seen in European terms whilst her global status, such as her permanent seat in the Security Council, will increasingly come under threat.

The Anglo-American relationship has been the cornerstone of the early post second world war international order. NATO has become embodied as fundamental to the greater Atlantic alliance. However, the relationship has been about the United States in Europe as its own front line of defence against the perceived Soviet threat. Protagonists of the need for continuing transatlantic security dimension may thus voice three fears:

**Fear of the Unknown.** NATO has served well for 40 years. It is still a point of stability in an uncertain world. It therefore provides a sense of security even though, under its present constitution, there is not much for it to do. The turning of the Cold War

on its head in just two to three years raises questions about future stability. The deterrent role that only the United States can provide therefore still has a place.

**Fear of the Past.** European nations have an unenviable record of fighting each other. The bi-polar world of the Cold War put a stop to that. The beginning of European integration is evidence that some countries can be trusted to put their house in order, but not without difficulty. For others, there are dangerous forces loosed by upheavals in eastern Europe and on the southern flank. These ethnic and nationalistic disorders are infectious, promoting instability and migration. The United States influence could help prevent the renationalisation of security and defence. Of particular importance is the provision of a stabilising influence as the relative weights of the players change or as the process of union falters. Britain continues to broker United States affairs in Europe and to provide a window on European concerns.

**Fear of Each Other.** If security is increasingly to be sought by economic means, the United States and Europe will become strong competitors. Maintenance of the alliance could help to ensure that economic rivalry is conducted in a climate of political friendship not hostility. There is no guarantee that problems will not arise, for example in GATT negotiations, but the alliance should inhibit a total breakdown.

Both Britain and the United States want a stronger European defence identity without compromise to the NATO framework and continue to emphasise the military arm of international security. Both countries have an unspoken interest in balancing Franco-German power. If it is restrained to its current area, NATO may still be a blind alley. The United States commitment may follow the pattern of twentieth century history and seem irrelevant and unnecessary. If the 'Europeanisation' of collective defence hastens this process, it is not yet clear what the results might be. Britain could submerge herself in EDI to preserve influence and prosperity as compensation for the United States seeing her as an increasingly minor player. In turn the parting of the ways could be friendly or rancorous.

Britain has a guaranteed say in world affairs through the United Nations Security Council. The Gulf War and the deployment to former Yugoslavia affirm British willingness to operate beyond the NATO area both in a humanitarian role and as part of a heavy fighting force. Britain leads the ARRC which could increase further her importance. For the United States, the commitment of its other allies may be less well defined. Nonetheless if collective bodies take on more responsibility for crisis management, the importance of individual players to the leadership process may decline. In addition more space will be needed for Germany and Japan to take a more active role in peace-keeping around the world when circumstances allow.

Despite a gulf in capability, both Britain and the United States are permanent members of the Security Council, possess nuclear weapons and export conventional arms. They support strongly the nuclear component of deterrence. They face the common problems of wishing to stop nuclear proliferation without losing their own deterrent capability, and of reducing the spread of conventional arms without catastrophic effects for their defence industries. The United States connection is vital to British national interest. The British deterrent may increase in significance if potential adversaries regard the United States guarantees as increasingly attenuated. Pressures may increase for the abolition of independent arsenals as part of the American/Russian bi-lateral arms reduction process whilst pressures to Europeanise deterrence weakens the United States link.

In the bi-lateral relationship the military links are strong and have proved resistant to change. Intelligence is proving of increasing value. Britain provides a benign environment for American bases that could become more strategically significant if an eastern-based threat re-emerges. Against this, the value of basing may diminish as security issues become more diverse. With more home-basing for the United States military becoming a reality, a more European looking defence posture by Britain will make the preservation of these links more difficult. In an era of financial stringency, there is a possibility that Britain may not be able to maintain her

access of privileged information on the cheap. In the growing field of economic intelligence, the allies may become competitors.

## **FUTURE MODELS**

One possible model for the future is based on the premise that as Cold War is over, the cement that held the partnership together has now crumbled with age. The incentive to maintain a particularly close relationship is diminishing, and the transatlantic bond is loosening. Currently the relationship is at the first stage of a change that is historically inevitable. British power, wealth and influence have consistently declined since 1945 and are becoming increasingly irrelevant to the United States who is seeking strong partners to help in the global role thrust upon it. Because of her decline, Britain is being driven increasingly towards Europe whose collective interests may diverge from those of the United States. There is increasing competition and a change in America's foreign policy direction towards the Pacific and Asia. Because of diminishing British influence, the power of Germany is rising, and it is Germany, rather than Britain, that the United States sees as the future European centre of gravity. Irrespective of shifting power balances, the United States interests in Europe become less compelling and slide down the ladder of its strategic priorities. For this scenario to be valid, Britain would need to move decisively in the European camp, the United States would need to be sure that it no longer needs a trusted ally in Europe, Britain would no longer see any advantage in seeking kudos and standing from its special links and would be content to remain reliant on the United States in the critical nuclear area.

On the other hand, it is also possible that the United States will retain a strong interest in ensuring benign developments in Europe, not only in security terms, but by seeking to prevent instability from overspilling from eastern Europe or the former Soviet republics. Economically, it will wish to break down protectionism. Britain, as a European but not a continental power, sees value for herself in the United States remaining linked to Europe to maintain a balance of power, thus preventing single nation dominance. Beyond Europe, the United States needs friends to

deal with problems on the global stage. Britain can be seen as a reliable partner with a similar view of world events. Validity for this model rests on Britain maintaining enough power to influence events and the United States continuing to see the need to achieve some of its vital objectives indirectly, with other players in a coalition, or through international mechanisms.

It is certain that the future will not conform to either extreme. Despite the end of the Cold War, it is unlikely that American interests in Europe will wane overnight, neither would the majority of European powers wish this to happen. Forward basing of military forces is being reduced. It will, therefore, be harder for the United States to remain engaged in a leadership position as troop levels decline, and as the rationale for remaining in Europe seems increasingly tenuous. All this could change if American troops based in Europe were deployed for operations in Europe, say in former Yugoslavia. Despite a reluctance to become committed to messy European problems, it will become harder for the United States to stand aside if international bodies to which it belongs, such as the UN or CSCE, take on more responsibility for resolving crises in Europe. In addition, the influence that the United States wields through NATO will be difficult to replace. It is not a member of the European Community or the WEU. CSCE, in which the United States is a full member, lacks weight and seems ineffective as a moderator.

However transatlantic her outlook, Britain must be increasingly defined in the context of Europe. In economic terms more than half her external trade is with the European Community and only some 15 per cent with North America. Whatever form the future transatlantic relationship takes, there is no alternative to Europe. This can put Britain and the United States on different sides. Britain is therefore likely to play down her Atlantic connection, at least in public, so as to maintain enough influence in Europe to serve transatlantic interest. An overt role as America's friend in Europe may be counter-productive, as would any clear statement that Britain was an advocate for American interest. With strains in the EDI evolution, Britain has a certain short term role. The Trident accords imply that the isolated, intimate and preferential nuclear partnership will last into the next century.

## CONCLUSION

Britain will continue to have a special relationship with the United States, at least for the near term. The bonds of history, culture and language, strengthened by tourism and television, seem too strong for it to be otherwise.<sup>82</sup> The relationship seems robust enough to be wheeled out for some time yet, either for endearment or abuse. However, there are no certainties. The diffusion of political power and growing importance of economic strength through the seventies have increased the complexity and diversity of the international environment. This cuts across old ties and assumptions. The gradual erosion of the intimate relationship of the seventies and the disagreements of eighties may still point to a gradual, but no less terminal, decline.<sup>83</sup> However, indications of terminal illness must be set against the historical ability of the relationship to survive crises and emerge the stronger for them.

The relationship is no longer just a matter of two countries acting in concert (indeed in Europe this may be counter-productive) but of one or both countries acting on the world stage in complementary ways, in line with broadly shared objectives. Britain will not want to be relegated to regional power status and will increasingly look to exert power and influence in co-operation with others. In this, she expects to find a natural ally in the United States. Until recently, it has been possible to count on a friendly President Bush. This helped London play an important role in salvaging the GATT negotiations. Major was not only able to speak as Chairman of the European Council but also as a dependable ally. The Thatcher-Reagan link, at times, seemed telepathic. During the Bush administration, the White House was only a telephone call away. Washington cannot now be taken for granted.

To survive, a relationship has to be two-way. In the past Britain mattered to the United States as a front line of defence, its entry point into Europe and its ally in the containment of communism. Her power has waned, whilst United States interests are shifting, reflecting economic priorities and a changing ethnic balance. If America reduces its foreign burdens and tilts towards the Pacific, becoming less willing to help defend Europe and more aggressive in



protecting its struggling economy, then Britain's future will accelerate towards closer relations with her European partners. The primary test of the future of the relationship may well lie in the evolution of European security. It will also not be easy to turn a fractious, wasteful European Community into a united political force, let alone an alliance responsible for its own security. However, European factors will have to be balanced against trends in wide ranging bi-lateral strategic, technical, operational, economic and commercial factors that will continue to colour the defence relationship of the two partners. In particular, the fundamental importance of the nuclear partnership should ensure an intimate defence relationship for the future.

During the nineties, Britain and the United States are likely to preserve *a* special relationship without it being *the* special relationship. This is consistent with history. Changes will be obvious to the United States as Britain seeks to nourish its relationship with Europe. Britain could still use its connection with the United States to forge a new transatlantic security regime. However, it will be important for Britain to avoid failing to find a suitable place in Europe for herself, by appearing to be looking too closely across the Atlantic, and yet failing to persuade the United States to maintain its commitment to the European future. For the United States, the challenge is to maintain political and public support for a continuing engagement in a more European Europe. It will need the support of Britain without making it obvious it is so doing. Kissinger, looking at Europe in the sixties provided a summary that seems as true today as it was then:

"No country can act wisely simultaneously in every part of the globe at every moment of time. A more pluralistic world - especially in relationships with our friends - is profoundly in our long-term interest. Political multipolarity, whilst difficult to get used to, is the precondition for a new period of creativity. Painful as it may be to admit, we could benefit from a counterweight that would discipline our occasional impetuosity and, by applying historical perspective, modify our penchant for abstract and 'final' solutions."<sup>84</sup>

## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> D Dimpleby and D Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart* (London: BBC Books Hodder & Stoughton 1988) p. 41
- <sup>2</sup> H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (London: Odhams Press, 1954), p.27.
- <sup>3</sup> Max Beloff, *The Special Relationship: an Anglo-American myth*, cited in David Reynolds, *A 'special relationship'? America, Britain and the international order since the second world war*, International Affairs, 1986 p.1.
- <sup>4</sup> Cited in David Reynolds, *A 'special relationship'? America, Britain and the international order since the second world war*, International Affairs, 1986 p.1.
- <sup>5</sup> John Baylis, *Anglo-American Defense Relations 1939-1984*, (New York: St Martins Press), p. xviii.
- <sup>6</sup> Cited in WM. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, *The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations since 1945*, (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1986), p.40.
- <sup>7</sup> *Idem*, *Anglo-American Defense Relations 1939-1984*, p. xv
- <sup>8</sup> *Idem*, *An Ocean Apart*, pp. 61-62.
- <sup>9</sup> George W. Egerton, *Britain and the "Great Betrayal": Anglo-American Relations and the Struggle for United States Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919-1920*. The Historical Journal, vol. 21 1978, p. 911 and quoted in *An Ocean Apart*, p. 73.
- <sup>10</sup> *Idem*, *An Ocean Apart*, p. 74
- <sup>11</sup> Francis L Loewenheim, Harold D Langley and Manfred Jonas (Editors), *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence*. (London, Barrie & Jenkins 1975).
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 125.
- <sup>13</sup> *Idem*, *Anglo-American Defense Relations 1939-1984*.
- <sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p.20
- <sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p.12
- <sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p.15
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p.122
- <sup>18</sup> Quoted in *Idem*, *An Ocean Apart*, p. 181
- <sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 182.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 202.
- <sup>21</sup> *Idem*, *An Ocean Apart*, p.222.
- <sup>22</sup> *Idem*, *Anglo-American Defense Relations 1939-1984*, p108.
- <sup>23</sup> *Idem*, *Anglo-American Defense Relations 1939-1984*, p.107.
- <sup>24</sup> *Cabinet Papers 1962: Rift revealed in the special relationship between London and Washington*, The Times, 1 January 1993.
- <sup>25</sup> D Nunnerley, *President Kennedy and Britain*, (London: Bodley Head, 1972)
- <sup>26</sup> Anthony Howard, *Caution in Westminster*, New Statesman, 26 October 1962.
- <sup>27</sup> *Idem*, *An Ocean Apart*, p. 247.
- <sup>28</sup> Harold Wilson, *The Labour Government 1964-1970: A Personal Record* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, and Michael Joseph 1971) p. 50.
- <sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p.80.
- <sup>30</sup> *Idem*, *An Ocean Apart*, p.258
- <sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p.264
- <sup>32</sup> *The Times*, 19 Oct 76.
- <sup>33</sup> *Idem*, *An Ocean Apart*, p.297
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p.298
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p.310
- <sup>36</sup> Henry A Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, (New York: Harper Brothers 1957) Chap 8 pp. 237-269.
- <sup>37</sup> *Idem*, *Anglo-American Defense Relations 1939-1984*, p223.
- <sup>38</sup> Professor Lawrence Freedman, *The Price of Staying Nuclear*, The Times, 9 Feb. 1982.
- <sup>39</sup> *Idem*, *An Ocean Apart*, p.316.
- <sup>40</sup> *Idem*, *An Ocean Apart*, p.317.
- <sup>41</sup> *Idem*, *Anglo-American Defense Relations 1939-1984*, p193.
- <sup>42</sup> *Idem*, *An Ocean Apart*, p.317
- <sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p.322.
- <sup>44</sup> *New York Times*, 11 Jan 1986.

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- <sup>45</sup> *Idem*, *An Ocean Apart*, p.325/
- <sup>46</sup> Richard E Neustadt, *Alliance Politics*, (New York and London: Colombia Press 1970), p.73.
- <sup>47</sup> Henry A Kissinger, *The White House Years* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, and Michael Joseph 1971), p.90.
- <sup>48</sup> David Reynolds, *A 'special relationship'? America, Britain and the international order since the second world war*, *International Affairs*, 1986 p.15.
- <sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p.330.
- <sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p.331.
- <sup>51</sup> *Idem*, *Alliance Politics*, p.75
- <sup>52</sup> *Idem*, *An Ocean Apart*, p.331.
- <sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p.213
- <sup>54</sup> *Idem*, *Anglo-American Defense Relations 1939-1984*, p.193.
- <sup>55</sup> M Clarke & R Hague editors, *European Defence Co-operation: America, Britain & NATO*, (Fulbright Papers: Proceedings of Colloquia: Vol. 7: Sep 90) p.31.
- <sup>56</sup> General Sir Peter de la Billiere, *RUSI Journal*, (Winter 1991), p.9.
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- <sup>58</sup> *The Times*, 12 Oct 91.
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- <sup>60</sup> *The Times*, 3 Feb 93.
- <sup>61</sup> *The Times*, 28 Jan 93.
- <sup>62</sup> Charles W Taylor, *A World 2010, A New Order of Nations*, (USAWC SSI 15 Nov 1991), p.1.
- <sup>63</sup> Donald M Snow, *Third World Conflict and the American Response in the Post-Cold War World*, (USAWC SSI Mar 91), p.1.
- <sup>64</sup> *The Post-Soviet World, The Resumption of History*, *The Economist* 26 Dec 1992.
- <sup>65</sup> *Ibid.* p.8.
- <sup>66</sup> Ian Greig, *Assault on the West*, (Foreign Affairs Publishing House 1969), p.2.
- <sup>67</sup> John Galtburg, *Conflict as a Way of Life*, (Survival, Jan 1970), p.14.
- <sup>68</sup> *Idem*, *Third World Conflict and the American Response in the Post-Cold War World*, p.16.
- <sup>69</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *Towards the Post-Cold War World*, (Foreign Affairs Spring 1991), pp. 102-122.
- <sup>70</sup> *Idem*, *The Economist* 26 Dec. 1992.
- <sup>71</sup> *Statement of Defence Estimates*, HMSO 1991.
- <sup>72</sup> *Treaty of Rome*, p.1.
- <sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, Strategic Concept paragraph 15.
- <sup>74</sup> *New York Times*, 11 Aug 91.
- <sup>75</sup> *Financial Times* 6 Apr 93.
- <sup>76</sup> *Financial Times* 9 Sep 92.
- <sup>77</sup> *The Times* 12 Dec 92.
- <sup>78</sup> Paragraph 52.
- <sup>79</sup> *Daily Telegraph* 6 Nov 91.
- <sup>80</sup> *Financial Times* 9 Sep 92.
- <sup>81</sup> *Jane's NATO Handbook* 1992.
- <sup>82</sup> *Idem*, *An Ocean Apart*, p.333.
- <sup>83</sup> *Idem*, *Anglo-American Defense Relations 1939-1984*, p.217.
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